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HARNESSING THE ATOMIC JUGGERNAUT:
THE NEED FOR MULTI-LATERAL INPUT
IN NUCLEAR ENERGY DECISION-MAKING

Technology which formerly existed only in the realm of science
fiction has been assimilated into the contemporary way of life.
Human beings walk upon the moon's surface; a space shuttle orbits
the earth; laser beams are being used to cure disease; and energy from
atomic fission is being used to create electricity. While technology
becomes more specialized, complex and inscrutable to the layperson,
society's dependence upon technology inexorably increases. The
trend towards technocracy must be met with active and intelligent
public participation in this atomic age, when one poorly rendered
decision can result in catastrophe.
The use of nuclear energy has been and continues to be promoted
as a solution to a bifurcated energy dilemma, whereby the supply of
economically extractable fossil fuels is plummeting while energy
demands rapidly multiply! It has been predicted that nuclear reactors, now supplying slightly over 5% of the nation's energy, will
provide over 50% by the year A.D. 2000.2 The national response to
the approximately 15% cutback in oil from Arabian nations illustrates what could result if nuclear energy was cut off in the year
2000.' Before time and resources become irrevocably committed to
nuclear power, several critical issues should be scrupulously
examined by a diverse and disinterested audience. Should the Atomic
Industrial Establishment 4 alone decide 1) what emission control
standards should be; 2) where and how atomic waste material should
be contained; and 3) to which forms of atomic energy producers
(light-water reactors, fast-breeder reactors, fusion reactors) priority
should be given? These problems, along with many others related to
nuclear energy, have grave implications for future generations whose
1. See, Hubbert, The Energy Resources of the Earth, 224 Scientific American 61, 64, 69
(1971).
2. Lewis, The Nuclear-Power Rebellion, at 20 (1972); see also, Swan, Management of
High-Level Radioactive Wastes: The AEC and the Legal Process, 1973 Law and the Social
Order 263; Newsweek, Dec. 10, 1973 at 137.
3. Interview with Charles Hyder, PhD., Environmental advisor to NASA and Professor of
astronomy at the University of New Mexico.
4. Atomic Industrial Establishment has been variously defined, but generally refers to the
coalition of the AEC, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the AEC's predominant contractors, General Electric and Westinghouse, as well as certain utility companies furnishing
atomic energy.
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interests are vitally affected by decisions which are made now. Traditionally, these decisions have been the almost exclusive domain of
the Atomic Energy Commission. Advice is proffered by organizations
such as the Federal Radiation Council, the National Academy of
Science and the National Council on Radiation Protection, but the
Atomic Energy Commission ultimately decides.s The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, formed in 1946 (the only committee with
legislative powers), provides the sole supervision of the AEC. Unhappily, this "supervision" has been less than adequate:
With sole authority in its area of activity, extremely broad
powers, and with much of its activity cloaked by security regulations
on information, the AEC is a singularly difficult body to influence.
It is subject only to the restraints of the Joint Committee, designated by law its "watchdog." Yet over the years, the two bodies
have drawn together until they are almost indistinguishable. 6
Criticism and comments from adverse camps have been ill-received
by the AEC. A former comissioner of the AEC has referred to the
" 'hogwash syndrome'. . . they talk and write about hazard and
accident possibilities but ignore the care that goes ... into hazard

and accident prevention," and " 'stirrer uppers' who do much to fan
unfounded fears by distorting or ignoring the facts." 7 In litigation,
discovery has been difficult. Industry and governmental employees
have proved hostile witnesses when called upon to testify regarding
technical aspects of their work.' Employees are discouraged from
endorsing attitudes not in line with AEC policy. The experience of
Arthur Tamplin, a highly regarded AEC researcher, and John
Gofman who was an associate director at the AEC's Livermore
laboratory illustrate the commission's response to valid differences of
opinion. The scientists, hired expressly to study the effects of radiation on man, challenged the AEC emission standard and called for
better radiation containment and a tenfold reduction of the annual
permissible dose.9

The AEC attacked their findings as "without

scientific validity" and censored papers which were to be presented
to professional associations. Tamplin's staff was transferred to other
projects. Ralph Nader was alerted to the Gofman-Tamplin plight and
responded in a letter to Senator Edmund Muskie:
5. Moore, The Environmentalist and Radioactive Wastes, 49 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 55, at 63

(1972).
6. S. Novick, The Careless Atom, 194 (1968).
7. Ramey, Radiation Protection-Past,Present, and Future, 11 Atomic Energy L.J. 1, at

2.
8. Moore, supra note 5, at 66.
9. See, Lewis, supra note 2, 81-108.
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As far as can be determined, the two scientists ... have been accused
of no wrongdoing, no violation of the AEC regulations and no scientific dishonesty. Actually, the available indications are that Gofman
and Tamplin have been accused of heresy by an agency so committed to the promotion of atomic energy that it has insisted that
radiation risks be treated more as articles of faith ... than as propositions to be examined continually.' 0
The practicality and the wisdom of the AEC's dual responsibility
as promoter and as regulator of the atomic energy industry has often
been questioned. Compounded by the agency's closed-door attitude,
the present arrangement seems counter-productive at best. Commentators have suggested bringing major issues out into public
scrutiny:
The attempts of the laboratory to disclaim such presentations by
Tamplin, or by Gofman and Tamplin jointly, have raised a number
of questions about the public responsibilities of a government
laboratory. Was it being operated in the public interest or in the
interest of a self-contained Establishment? How can the public interest be advanced by censoring dissent?' 1
Dissent and citizen organization have advanced the public interest in
spite of AEC admonitions to the contrary. Examples of public intervention and its healthy influence upon the final resolution in each
instance stress the importance of encouraging and expanding public
intervention in proposed and pending atomic energy projects.
Emission standards have been one of the most bitterly contested
issues surrounding the operation of nuclear power plants. A growing
body of scientists, including Linus Pauling and Ernest Stienglass
along with the previously mentioned Gofman and Tamplin, claim
that radiation emission standards as presently established (170
millirads' 2 annual dose per person) are at least ten times too high.
Evidence has been found which has led these scientists to believe that
such a high level of radiation exposure has been the cause of increased incidence of birth defects, cancer and leukemia.' 3 Gofman
and Tamplin have stated that the 170 millirad dose is responsible for
1
approximately 32,000 deaths a year from cancer and leukemia. 4
Most authorities now agree, as the Federal Radiation Council
10. Lewis, supra note 2, at 101.
11. Lewis, supra note 2, at 100.
12. Millirad is 1/1000 of a rad: Radiation Absorbed Dose, amount of radiated energy
absorbed by animal tissue. The maximum permissible dose of radiation per year is determined by dividing 5 rads by 30 years-170 millirads a year.
13. See, Lewis, supra note 2, 48-80; see also, N. Fabricant and R. M. Hallman, Toward a
Rational Power Policy: Energy, Politics, and Pollution 112 (1971).
14. Green, Radioactive Waste & the Environment, 11 Natural Resources J. 280 (1971).
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every use of radiation involves the possibility of

some biological risk either to the individual or his descendants."' I A
1960 Federal Radiation Council Report, regarded as the fundamental
document establishing national policy with respect to radiation
protection standards, presents certain basic biological assumptions:
There are insufficient data to provide a firm basis for evaluating
radiation effects for all types and levels of irradiation. There is
particular uncertainty with respect to the biological effects at very
low dose rates. It is not prudent therefore to assume that there is a
level of radiation exposure below which there is absolute certainty
that no effect may occur. This consideration in addition to the
adoption of the conservative hypothesis of a linear relationship
between biological effect and the amount of dose, determining our
16
basic approach to the formulation of radiation protection guides.
Yet the federal government, comfortably believing that the benefits justify the risks, still permits emissions of 170 millirads per
person per year, although present technology is capable of producing
atomic energy with dramatically less emission of radioactive matter.
Fortunately, public intervention has contributed to the implementation of more realistic emission standards. Courageous scientists challenging the sanctity of the atomic industrial establishment provided
the catalyst, while active, knowledgeable citizens and an independent, concerned judiciary brought these ideas of life.
The battle between the State of Minnesota and Northern States
Power exemplifies what can be achieved in the face of a monolithic
entity such as the atomic industrial establishment and stresses what
results must still be sought.' 7 Minnesota's standards for radioactive
emissions and wastes were 100 times more restrictive than the AEC
limits. Minnesota moved to enforce its standards, when the Northern
States Power Company received an AEC permit to build a light/water
reactor at Monticello, Minnesota, 40 miles upstream from St. Paul
and Minneapolis. The power companies resisted, claiming that even
where technically feasible, enforcing Minnesota standards would
force increased costs. This was simply a value judgment made by the
atomic industrial establishment, not the consumers and the Minnesota citizens, whereby economy of operations was given a higher
priority than environmental health and safety. The company defended its stance on the ground that AEC standards were national
and thus pre-empted imposition of state standards, even in the state's
15. Fabricant and Hallman, supra note 13, at 32; see also, J. Gofman and A. Tamplin,
Nuclear Power, Technology and EnvironmentalLaw, 2 Environmental Law 57, at 61.
16. 1 CCH Atomic Energy Rep. 4046.
17. Lewis, supra note 2, 122-135. See also Moore, supra note 5, 71-74.
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exercise of its police power to protect life and property. In Northern
States Power Co. v. State of Minnesota"8 the Supreme Court of
Minnesota held that the State of Minnesota was without authority to
regulate the release of radioactive discharges, because Congress had
pre-empted the field of regulation.
Fortunately, this was not the end. Public attention was aroused.
Once a small band of scientists, the AEC's adversary was now the
government of a state, which, in the words of consultant Professor
Ernest C. Tsivoglou, questions industry's right to "contaminate the
environment beyond the limits of necessity," when it had been established that in most cases emissions could be kept under 1% of the
standards set by the federal government. 1 9 Groups such as the
Minnesota Environmental Control Citizen's Association (MECCA)
intervened at the operating-license stage of the federally recommended licensing procedure and demanded a public hearing. During
the course of this public hearing, the validity of certain inspection
reports (generally of public record) was impeached by evidence of
censorship, deletions and indications of technical violations. It was
found that most monitoring of plant sites and testing of components
was done, not by government inspectors, but by the companies
themselves. "At many points ...it was clear that the Regulatory
Staff [of the AEC] does no independent testing, but rather dedicates
itself to searching through stacks of paper and taking the word of the
applicant." 2 Obviously the evils which governmental regulation was
instituted to avoid are not in the least thwarted by this sort of
"regulation."
Although a limited license was granted, the next day Northern
States Power Company announced that the Monticello plant would
be modified to reduce radioactive discharges in effective compliance
with the standards adopted by Minnesota. While citizen intervenors
achieved a de facto victory, it was not the result of the exercise of a
legally established right; nor was Minnesota's legal right to establish
its own emission standards recognized. Thus, the need to establish
legal avenues for citizen and state participation and control in the
setting of emission standards is obvious.
The transfer of full regulatory authority in standard setting, matters of safety, public health and environmental impact and re18. 320 F. Supp. 172 (D. Minn. 1970),aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
19. Statement of Ernest C. Tsvoglou to the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, quoted
in Lewis, supra note 2, at 127.
20. Statement of intervenors Kenneth Dzugan, George Burnett II, and Theodore Pepin in
the Monticello Nuclear Power Station Operating License Hearing, August 24, 1970, quoted
in Lewis, supra note 2, at 131.
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licensing procedures for nuclear facilities from the AEC to the EPA
(Environmental Protection Agency) has been recommended enthusiastically by several commentators including the Environmental
Protection Administration of the City of New York." (Approximately 40% of New York City's energy comes from nuclear reactors.) This transfer would encourage a more impartial balancing
between energy demands and the need for a viable environment. The
public too, through citizen groups and the political process itself,
should not be excluded from the complex, yet terribly important,
process of establishing emission standards and other environmental
parameters necessary in controlling the production of nuclear energy.
Lauriston Taylor, Chairman of the National Council for Radiation
Protection, has stated that "the setting of radiation standards is not
basically a scientific standard. . . . It is more a matter of philosophy,
of morality, and of sheer wisdom." 2 2 The atomic industrial establishment alone cannot determine for the public which priorities it
will choose. It is a matter of public policy, whereby the people select
their priorities and accept the costs of that choice.
The landmark opinion in Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee,
Inc. v. AEC,2 3 has been one of the most encouraging results of
citizen intervention. 2" The construction of a 1600 megawatt nuclear
powerplant on the western shore of Chesapeake Bay precipitated a
raging controversy over pollution of the bay by atomic wastes (principally tritium) and thermal wastes which endangered much of the
bay's flora and fauna.2 5 The Chesapeake Environmental Protection
Association (CEPA) was formed and intervened at the licensing hearings. The AEC, however, disregarded CEPA's fundamental contentions, while alleging that 1) the tritium discharge was acceptable,
because it came within federally prescribed standards, 2 6 and 2)
thermal pollution was beyond the AEC's purview.
The AEC had placed itself beyond the reach of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) until it could complete a study
establishing special regulations pursuant to NEPA. While the AEC
asserted jurisdictional and standing deficiencies on the part of the
21. Fabricant and Hallman, supra note 13, at 291.
22. Green, supra note 14, at 293.
23. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

24. Lewis, supra note 2, 257-297.
25. Federal Power Commission study found that aquatic species are delicately attuned to
their environment and slight changes in temperature can decrease their viability considerably; "All aquatic species have an optimal temperature range.... If the temperature varies
above or below this range, the chances of survival for that species incrementally decreases."
Lewis, supra note 2, at 274.
26. 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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intervenors, citizens formed a new organization, Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee, and solicited help from the Sierra Club, the
National Wildlife Federation and certain Washington, D.C.,
attorneys. They demanded that the AEC issue environmental impact
statements pursuant to the requirements of NEPA before continuing
construction of the plant. The AEC continued construction promising to comply with NEPA when the special AEC rules under it had
been developed. A petition to the Maryland Court of Appeals requested the AEC to show cause why plant construction should not
be suspended pending complete review of environmental consequences as required by NEPA. At this point, the AEC issued its regulations pursuant to NEPA. They stipulated among other things that: 1)
environmental matters must be affirmatively raised at hearings or
they would not be considered; 2) non-radiological environmental
issues could not be raised at hearings where notice was published
before March 4, 1971 (this would exclude the thermal pollution issue
in the Calvert Cliffs hearings); and 3) certificates of compliance with
other state and federal environmental standards shall preclude
further investigation by the AEC. These regulations seemed to treat
NEPA as a statement of policy rather than law. The Calvert Cliffs
Coordinating Committee was not placated, and the matter was
finally resolved by the United States Court of Appeals.
The coordinating committee ultimately prevailed. The AEC was
required under NEPA to substantially broaden its rules in respect to
environmental consequences of the construction and operation of
nuclear power plants. Judge J. Skelly Wright further illuminated the
purpose of the NEPA and the responsibilities of federal agencies
pursuant to that act:
NEPA, first of all, makes environmental protection a part of the
mandate of every federal agency and department. The Atomic
Energy Commission, for example, had continually asserted, prior to
NEPA, that it had no statutory authority to concern itself with the
adverse environmental effects of its actions. Now, however, its hands
are no longer tied. It is not only permitted, but compelled, to take
environmental issues into account.
We believe that the Commission's crabbed interpretation of NEPA
makes a mockery of the Act. 2 7 NEPA requires that an agency
must-to the fullest extent possible under its other statutory obligations-consider alternatives to its actions which would reduce environmental damage. That principle establishes that considerations of
environmental matters must be more than a pro forma ritual. Clearly
27. Id. at 1117.
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it is pointless to "consider" costs without also seriously considering
action to avoid them. 28

This landmark decision has erased all speculation as to the role
NEPA was to play in protecting those environmental parameters
defined by Congress. Had citizens assumed a passive role and allowed
the AEC to regulate itself, the vitality of the NEPA might have been
destroyed quietly and insiduously by agency interpretation of it as a
mere policy statement.
Currently, citizen groups are actively participating in the problem
of disposal of atomic wastes. This is an environmental concern which
is greatly in need of multilateral input and which should be given
increased national exposure. The AEC predicts that boiling-water
reactors and liquid-metal reactors will produce an annual combined
spent-fuel discharge of over 15,000 tons by the year 2000.2 9 While
most of the atomic wastes created today result from energy generation, wastes do remain from 25 years of weapons production as well.
These wastes are classified as low-level and high-level. High level
wastes, cesium 137, strontium 90 and transuranic isotopes such as
plutonium 239, present the greatest health hazard and the most complex problems of disposal.
Plutonium 239, one of the most explosive and toxic substances
known to man, should be isolated from the biosphere for hundreds
of thousands of years. Cesium 137 and strontium 90 are also extremely poisonous and require containment for hundreds of years.
Because larger quantities of these elements are generated and because
they migrate through the soil toward groundwater at a significantly
greater rate than does plutonium 239, cesium 137 and strontium 90
could present a greater immediate hazard. 3 0 High level wastes generate a considerable amount of heat through radioactive decay, thus
the stainless steel, concrete-sheathed underground tanks in which
these wastes are presently being stored must be periodically cooled.
There is a danger that plutonium 239 will reach a critical mass resulting in an explosion, which would release the highly toxic and radioactive substance into the atmosphere. High level radioactive wastes
have a tendency to concentrate along the food chain, greatly enhancing the danger to human beings and other forms of life. Hazards are
amplified by the possibility of military attack at a storage site, as
well as by natural calamities such as earthquakes. Extreme care must
28. Id. at 1128.
29. Swan, supra note 2, 263-64.
30. C. Fox, Radioactive Wastes, USAEC Division of Technical Information, 12, 13
(1969).
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be taken to insure that wastes are not disposed of near a water table
in order to prevent the contamination of human water supplies.
High level wastes are currently being stored in underground tanks
cooled by immersion coils. 75% of these wastes, amounting to more
than 75 million gallons, are being kept in Hanford, Washington.
Other storage sites are located at the National Reactor Testing Station in Idaho and the Savannah River Plant in South Carolina.
These various locations are intended merely as temporary disposal
sites, until the AEC decides where and how these highly toxic wastes
shall be permanently disposed of. None of the presently employed
locations is suitable for permanent storage and the near perpetual
guardianship which that entails. A government report stated
that none of the major sites (including the Hanford Reservation) at
which radioactive wastes are being stored or disposed of is geologically suited for safe disposal of any manner of radioactive wastes
other than very dilute, very low-level liquids....
Indeed, high level wastes have leaked out of underground tanks on
16 occasions releasing radioactive matter into the ground and possibly the water supply. 3 2 Proposals for future disposal include burial
in bedded salt deposits, storage in engineered surface facilities above
ground and even rocketing the wastes into outer space. 3
The development of a pilot salt bed deposit in Lyons County,
Kansas, was arrested, when it was found that water could reach the
salt mines and cause the wastes (which were to have been stored in
unrecoverable vessels disintegrating within a few years) to be leached
into the soil. Citizen intervention helped to expose this hazard and
bring it to the attention of the decision-makers.
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Dixie Lee Ray3 an
environmental impact statement was required of the AEC in regard
'

31. Committee on Geologic Aspects of Radioactive Waste Disposal, Division of Earth
Sciences, National Academy of Sciences- National Research Council, Report to the Division
of Reactor Development and Technology, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, at 11 (May
1966).
32. Several leaks have been detected near the Hanford site. By the end of 1972, 190,000
curies of cesium 137 had leaked into the soil. Two recent leaks, including the largest ever of
115,000 gallons, have added approximately another 40,000 curies of cesium-137 and
15,000 curies of strontium-90. See AEC Richland Operations Office Press Release dated
July 10, 1973; San Francisco Chronicle, June 13, 1973; Oregon Times, 20 (July 1973).
Additionally about 100,000 gallons of high-level wastes have leaked from waste transfer
pipelines. Seattle Times, July 15, 1973.
33. See, Swan, supra note 2,and Fox, supra note 30, 24-27.
34. See, Lewis, supra note 2, 148-171.
35. Complaint and Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Application for Preliminary
Injunction, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Dixie Lee Ray, Civil Action #3924
(E.D. Wash. 1973).
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to waste disposal in the Hanford, Washington facility. The AEC
agreed to prepare an impact statement, if possible, before generating
any further radioactive wastes at the spent-fuel processing plant.
According to John Bryson, an attorney for the Natural Resources
Defense Council, "We think that this lawsuit and today's agreement
and order will make a small contribution to the very substantial
problems posed by the necessity to keep radioactive wastes isolated
from the environment for centuries to come." 3 6
The disposal of atomic wastes is a crucial problem of immediate
importance. New problems are being perceived, new issues are appearing and new policies are developing. Concern is mounting, but
unfortunately, not everyone appears sufficiently worried.
Neither the President, the Congress, the scientists or the people
appear to be sufficiently worried about the atomic graveyards. An
explosion in any one of them could easily result in the nuclear
contamination of a large part of the United States. Built over aquifers, near major rivers, in the desert, or even in salt mines, they are
potentially the most dangerous regions on earth. Are they as safe as
the AEC contends? They can't be! If they were, no one would
have
3
suggested the futuristic concept of moving them to the sun.

7

In New Mexico, hearings are scheduled within the year concerning
the construction of a bedded salt pilot plant near Carlsbad. Stringent
site selection factors have been designed to enable the plant to be
expanded to a full-scale repository, if all health and safety requirements and other environmental considerations are satisfactorily
met.3 I Citizen groups, such as the Southwest Research and Information Center and New Mexico Citizens for Clean Air and Water, are
currently studying aspects of this proposal and plan to contribute
their findings to the public hearings. 3 9 This intervention will bring
more aspects of the proposal under public scrutiny and will inject
policy considerations which might otherwise have been left unevaluated. With such multilateral input the final resolution of the proposed bedded salt pilot plant near Carlsbad can not help but be
better reasoned than it would have been if made solely by the atomic
industrial establishment.
Emission standards, thermal pollution and containment of atomic
wastes are but a few of the complex problems of tremendous import
36. Agreement and Order in Radioactive Wastes Lawsuit, Natural Resources Defense
Council memorandum, August 17, 1973.
37. Moore, supra note 5, at 80.

38. Letter from Elliot Winnock, attorney, Office of the General Counsel, Atomic Energy
Commission, January 8, 1974.
39. Hyder, supra note 3.
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associated with the use of nuclear energy. The hazards are numerous:
the failure of a cooling apparatus which could cause a nuclear explosion; an accident in transit; the threat to national security; leaks
undetected; leaks unreported; and these are but a few of the dangers.
Plutonium's deadliness, coupled with its 24,000 year half life, bring
the very use of the fast breeder reactor, the primary producer of
plutonium, into question. Alternative sources of energy should be
considered, as they should have been years ago before the nation
became so singularly committed to fossil fuels. Even the fusion reactor is a viable alternative. Being developed at this time, the fusion
reactor is fueled by deuterium (heavy hydrogen) which is abundant.
It is almost twice as efficient as the fission reactors and appears to be
far safer. It is claimed that research priorities have been given to the
fission reactors, and there is little incentive to abandon that campaign in favor of a fusion campaign.4 0 Public pressure could provide
the incentive.
Perhaps fission energy is inevitable. If so, the inherent risks are
inevitable also, and they will multiply as light-water and fast-breeder
reactors become far larger and far more numerous. While the atomic
industrial establishment has done a very good job in averting catastrophic accidents, the time has come for citizens to participate in
the process by which these risks are allocated.
It is not suggested that the AEC program is going forward in
callous disregard of the risks attributable to radioactive wastes.
Rather those government officials responsible for the licensing and
regulation of AEC activities as well as those scientists who develop
the radiation protection standards, sincerely believe that the risks are
trivial and far out-balanced by the benefits. 4 '
In short, decision making in atomic energy programs has largely

been removed from the normal process of open debate. There is no
question but that the Joint Committee and the AEC are conscientious and acutely aware of the need for safety. Yet it is too much to
ask them to make decisions unassisted which have such sweeping
importance for society. It is too much to ask them to judge the
safety and advisability of programs in the development 4of2 which

they have themselves invested many years and great efforts.

Before technological mystique and bureaucratic detachment cause
public participation to be virtually impossible, political energies
should be invested in developing means of achieving avenues of public involvement in the decision making process. Intervention by citi40. Lewis, supra note 2, 233-235.
41. Green, supra note 14, at 294.
42. Novick, supra note 6, at 195.
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zen groups at administrative hearings has often proved successful as
in the Northern Power and Calvert Cliffs cases. These groups should
be encouraged and supported as should the institution of public
hearings. Also, the recording of administrative review proceedings,
such as license hearings, should be a regular practice. Information
must be disseminated and care must be taken to assure its objectivity
and accuracy. The Committee for Nuclear Information (now called
the Committee for Environmental Information) has published a
monthly bulletin for ten years, Nuclear Information. Now a monthly
magazine is being published entitled Scientist and Citizen.4" Organizations and publications such as these help bring crucial issues before
the public. Only with exposure to facts, issues and various opinions
can the public intelligently exercise its right to participate in the
development of the nuclear industrial establishment. Public awareness will bring these issues into the political arena where politicians
will be compelled to respond to the sentiments of their constituents.
Such multilateral input will result in more responsive and better
considered legislation which is essential to intelligent regulation of
atomic energy. Existing legislation, such as the National Environmental Policy Act, the Administrative Procedure Act and the Freedom of Information Act, must be broadly and wisely interpreted by
the courts which help bring Congressional action to life. Citizen
groups should be given liberal standing to insure the necessary checks
and balances provided by judicial review.
The time has come. Before we have become abjectly dependent on
nuclear energy (specifically fission) and have become resigned to pay
its rather drastic costs, we must openly and actively participate in the
creation of a new form of decision-making policy and procedure.
Fission reactors must not be allowed to spawn on an ad hoc, laissez
faire or leave-it-to-Big Brother basis. The result of even a small miscalculation can be disastrous. Clearly, we must take the responsibility
to contribute to the sensitive decisions and evaluations which must
be made and to establish a precedent, whereby the atomic industrial
establishment must cooperate with and work with a constantly vigilant public.
PAMELA PAIGE MURPHY

43. Id. 198-201.

